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Abstract 
This article focuses on Lars von Trier’s 2011 film, Melancholia, described as ‘a 
beautiful film about the end of the world’ and interlocking personal and global 
tragedy. Drawing directly on her personal emotional response to the film, and 
referring to her profound incapacity to talk about it for many years after an initial 
encounter with it, the author turns to a range of object relations psychoanalytic 
thinkers to consider what such experience has to say about lived emotional 
relationships to cinema, and its role in shaping and articulating psychological, and 
affective states. The article touches on debates about the cinematic gaze, and the role 
of film as a psychological object, and considers whether film might be seen as 
offering a form of therapeutic encounter for viewers.  
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Lars von Trier’s Melancholia (Denmark, 2011) is a film about the end of the world. 
More specifically, it is a film about the approach of the end of the world as a result of 
the Earth crashing into an enormous planet named Melancholia. True to form, von 
Trier does not pull any punches when it comes to symbolism that lacks subtlety – this 
work is full of heightened melodrama on an epic scale, all of which is reinforced 
through the film’s aesthetics. Both Manuel Alberto Claro’s cinematography and the 
musical score combine to lend emotional weight and torpor to the drama, adding to 
von Trier’s reputation for making bold cinema that lays down copious affective and 
psychological challenges. This particular film’s invitation into the melancholic state 
of mind is one that is difficult to resist. Coloured as it is by the director’s own well 
documented experiences of mental illness and collapse, the full force of Melancholia 
is gruelling for even the most hardened critics: Jonathan Romney (2011), for example, 
describes the film as ‘severe and graceful’, remarking that watching it persuaded him 
to forgive von Trier for making Antichrist (Denmark, 2009). In The Telegraph, 
Sukhdev Sandhu (2011) noted that the film was ‘emotionally seismic’ despite the 
claims made elsewhere that it was an exercise in narcissistic solipsism (French 2011). 
Broadly speaking, even the British tabloid press hailed the film’s beguiling aesthetics 
and its intense treatment of ‘manic depression’ and ‘existential angst’ (Palmer 2011), 
despite the reviewer at The Express (Hunter 2011) finding the characters ‘annoying’.  
My own personal experience of the film was deeply imbued with an 
overwhelming sense of desolation, a feeling that was difficult to shake off, and which 
felt insistent in its capacity to inhabit my imagination and memory over time. 
Melancholia took on a profound bleakness for me, and I found it impossible to speak 
about either these feelings or the film itself for many months – indeed, years. I felt as 
though something unspeakable had taken place inside me, although I was nevertheless 
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consumed by a plenitudinous sense of the film’s astonishing beauty. As an affective 
viewing experience, watching Melancholia was awe-inspiring in all its entangled 
senses: the film is beautiful, terrible, majestic, and fearful all at once. And yet, I 
hesitate to name my experience as sublime. Its texture was profoundly psychological 
for me, demanding thoughtful reflection and contemplation in order for the 
experience to make any sense. As a psychoanalytic scholar, I felt certain that 
processing the experience would deepen my thinking about theory, and that the 
conceptual framework of ideas would allow me to analyse and understand my own 
visceral response. And yet, for many years, I felt incapable of speaking about this 
film, finding that I was incapable of voicing any aspect of my experience, despite not 
being able to lose sight of the film’s imagery in my mind’s eye. I could not find a way 
to put into words the extent of my embodied emotional depth of feeling prompted by 
the film’s narrative and plot.  
This sense of feeling “stuck” paradoxically intensified my awareness of the 
need to interrogate my resistance, in an effort to understand, by using the tools of 
psychoanalysis, exactly what about this film I was unable to digest and mentalise. In 
turn, this heightened awareness of what I was not doing –of what I did not feel able to 
do – and began to impact on my confidence about my capacity to think 
psychoanalytically at all. I found myself constantly questioning my thought processes 
as well as my competence (as a non-clinician) to work with complex psychoanalytic 
ideas. In short, I began to fear that, when it came to this film, I was irretrievably 
caught up in a mode of melancholic thinking, a state of mind that only began to be 
challenged once I received an invitation to discuss the film in public some years later. 
Even then, I struggled to mobilise my thinking, and, in the end, opted to discuss my 
experience of the film as a way of trying to reflect on its artistic and affective power. 
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These thoughts are the ones being used here to give shape to this article, and my 
discussion will range freely across personal experience, psychoanalytic theory, and 
critical approaches to the film as both text and mediated object, as I attempt to grapple 
with what it might mean to experience what I shall coin as “a melancholic gaze”. 
It is well documented that von Trier’s aim in making this film and its 
predecessor, Antichrist, was to grapple with his personal experiences of clinical 
depression, and to use film making as a ‘tool to get out of bed’ (More 4, no date). I 
have written elsewhere (Bainbridge 2014, p. 56) about the rich thematic content of 
von Trier’s work, and its scope ‘to allow for a kind of working through that might be 
seen as therapeutic for both the director and viewers of his films’, making specific 
reference to the psychological mechanism of projective identification, and to the 
notions of containment and holding space described in the work of Wilfrid Bion and 
Donald Woods Winnicott respectively. In that discussion, I suggested that the graphic 
content of von Trier’s films co-exists with popular media commentary on his 
experience of mental illness, and that this combination allows audiences to internalise 
the projections, and to process them as a form of communication about unspeakable 
experience. Here, by contrast, I wish to focus in more depth on the characteristics of 
the kind of viewing experience evoked by Melancholia in particular, and to consider 
the film as a psychological object of sorts. In this guise, the film affects viewers 
through its conjuring of mood, but it also enables a deeper understanding of how 
cinema can furnish spectators with an experience of maternal containment that allows 
the exploration of unthinkable and unspeakable experience. What follows, then, is an 
excursion through my thought process about Melancholia, and the critical theoretical 
and conceptual ideas associated with this, which I offer here as a way into 
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understanding the challenges and invitations extended by Lars von Trier by means of 
his work as an artistic project. 
To begin with, there is Melanie Klein. The filmic narrative of Melancholia 
almost demands a Kleinian reading with its striking themes of splitting, annihilation, 
persecutory anxiety, paranoia, and, of course, the bad parental objects. At the most 
basic level of the plot, splitting is in operation throughout, as von Trier contrasts 
sisters Justine (Kirsten Dunst) and Claire (Charlotte Gainsbourg), their individual 
experiences of close, personal relationships, and the approach of the deadly planet. 
The film itself is also in two parts, evoking even in its structure the concept of 
splitting, as it reveals the distinct emotional textures of lived and affective experience 
from the perspectives of different characters. For Klein (1930), the mechanism of 
splitting is key to the paranoid-schizoid position and to early infantile experience, 
when objects are largely distinguished as “wholly good” or “wholly bad” for the baby 
during the struggle to integrate competing and contradictory experiences of love and 
hate. This also leads to internalised uses of splitting in relation to the ego as an active 
form of psychological defence (Klein 1933; 1946), working in tandem with projective 
impulses to rid the infant of intolerable feelings and anxieties. Splitting is of 
fundamental importance in the Kleinian formulation of the paranoid-schizoid 
position, which is rooted in the infant’s earliest, pre-linguistic psychological 
experience, with all its associated anxieties and defences. The paranoid-schizoid 
position is also linked to the development of relatedness to both internal and external 
objects, a theme that resonates in von Trier’s film thanks to its deployment of the 
imagined planet, Melancholia, and its symbolic power to conjure up the emotional 
and psychological dimensions of character and plot. The film’s externalisation of the 
overwhelming threat of annihilation, together with its apparent imminence and reality, 
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helpfully metaphorises the kinds of psychological mechanism linked by Klein to the 
paranoid-schizoid phases of development. The projection of paranoid fears of 
disintegration and annihilation is central to the plot of Melancholia, speaking to 
aspects of the most primitive forms of human nature, but this also reveals the texture 
of adult melancholic experience, illustrating how the stultifying sense of incapacity 
and ineptitude in the face of all-consuming depression simply cannot be 
communicated effectively. Justine’s deep depression and her inability to talk, eat, or 
function is unspeakable, and yet so palpable in this film, showing that von Trier’s 
directorial style can help viewers to understand something of the quality of such 
experience.  
As is well documented, Klein differs slightly (but also importantly) from 
Sigmund Freud in her conceptualisation of melancholia, in that for Klein, all losses 
revive earlier experiences of loss and so require the reworking of the internal world in 
order for recovery to take place. For Klein, the infantile depressive position ‘is a 
melancholia in statu nascendi’. All losses, both real and phantasied, are rooted in the 
experience of early infantile losses of what she describes as ‘the mother's breast and 
all that the breast and milk have come to stand for in the infant's mind: namely, love, 
goodness and security. All of these are felt by the baby to be lost, and lost as a result 
of his own uncontrollable greedy and destructive impulses’ (1940, p. 345).  
For Klein, then, the unconscious phantasy underpinning the experience of loss 
is to be understood in terms of the baby ‘having lost his [sic] internal "good" objects 
... He then feels that his [sic] internal "bad" objects predominate and his [sic] inner 
world is in danger of disruption’ (1940, p. 353). Splitting is key here, and Klein alerts 
us to this dimension of the melancholic experience – the reversion to an early infantile 
paranoid-schizoid mechanism leads to idealisation and denigration, and these come to 
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characterise the melancholic disposition. There are affinities here with Freud’s (1917, 
p. 258) formulation of the more manic formations of melancholia in terms of 
ambivalence, and this is another theme of von Trier’s film, played out most starkly in 
the Oedipal triangle of Claire, John (Kiefer Sutherland), and their son, Leo (Cameron 
Spurr). While John repeatedly attempts to reassure Leo and Claire of their safety, he 
takes the cowardly decision to kill himself once he realises that the planet’s advance 
toward Earth is inevitable. He does this without regard for the impact on his surviving 
family members, plunging Claire into her own existential angst and maternal 
ambivalence. It is, ironically, the melancholic Justine who is able to devise and 
sustain a form of containment, in her building of the tipi structure inside which they 
all sit holding hands at the end of the film (and, of course, at the fictional end of the 
world). In building the “magic cave” for Leo, Justine manages to forge a sense of 
relatedness in the face of imminent annihilation. The viewer is left asking whether 
this “ending” signifies a recovery of some sort, and puzzling about what it would 
mean to recover in order only to die? In this conundrum lies the kernel of what it 
means to be human, and the challenges entailed in attempting to grapple with this 
question. 
In a discussion of how the melancholic individual is better equipped for 
catastrophe (Sweet 2011: 05:37-06:42), von Trier himself has remarked,  
 
it’s very likely that it will be a person with some mental illness that will be the 
hero that kind of drags children out of a burning train, or stuff like that, 
because, people who have never been there before … never had an anxiety … 
never thought about this side of life, will panic completely, whereas Justine 
has been there before, and therefore can be much more rational.  
 9 
 
For von Trier, the profound experience of depression familiarises the subject with the 
kind of despair associated with the disintegration of the world and its accessibility. A 
Kleinian approach to this thematic must also consider the relationship to parental 
figures (or objects) who provide (or fail to provide) the infant with the kind of 
containment evoked by von Trier in his discussion of the film’s closing sequence. 
Melancholia offers its viewers a deeply dysfunctional family constellation, 
linking Justine’s melancholic state to her parents and their ineptitude and failures. It 
also shows how such dysfunctionality underpins and influences relationship patterns 
that emerge in later life, as Justine struggles to deal with her sleazy, gaslighting boss 
(Stellan Skarsgård), and cuts herself off from her newly-wed husband (Michael 
[Alexander Skarsgård]) within hours of her marriage. Justine’s father, Dexter (John 
Hurt), and mother, Gaby (Charlotte Rampling), are acrimoniously divorced and 
profoundly narcissistic, unable to relate to Justine and manipulating her to their own 
ends. Similarly, her boss, Jack, uses his wedding speech as an opportunity ruthlessly 
to bully Justine about a pending work deadline that she will later fail to meet, 
seemingly triggering her melancholic episode, and fracturing her capacity for 
relatedness with apparently immediate effect.  
Later, following an indeterminate period after the wedding, Justine arrives to 
stay with Claire, John, and Leo during a very profound and debilitating episode of 
depression. It appears that Justine is beyond help, and no amount of effort by Claire 
can help her. When Claire cooks Justine’s favourite dish (meatloaf), Justine cannot 
bear to eat, complaining that it only tastes of ash. Her only point of sustained 
emotional connection is with her horse, Abraham, but even he appears to let her 
down, and she becomes violent toward the animal, heartlessly whipping it into 
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submission. The imagery in such scenes is riven with symbolism, but it also calls to 
mind the Kleinian framework of internalised objects, the mechanism of projection, 
and their importance for psychological development.  
According to Klein, internal objects are rooted in the infant’s earliest 
relationship to the parents, and they are crucial for sustaining mental health. In her 
discussion of the psychogenesis of “manic-depressive” states, Klein (1935, p. 265) 
asserts the close link between the paranoid and melancholic states of mind, observing 
that the superego becomes relentlessly severe in the context of melancholia partly as a 
result of the ego’s ‘torturing and perilous dependence on its loved objects’ (1935, p. 
277). Nevertheless, the melancholic is compelled to cling on to its internal objects 
because ‘its identification with [them] is too profound to be renounced’ (1935, p. 
277). For the melancholic, then, the defence mechanisms of the paranoid-schizoid 
stage, especially those of denial and splitting, become fundamentally important for 
survival. Klein (1935, p. 287) notes that ‘ambivalence, carried out in a splitting of the 
imagoes, enables the small child to gain more trust and belief in its real objects and 
thus in its internalised ones—to love them more and to carry out in an increasing 
degree its phantasies of restoration on the loved object’. It is splitting, together with 
ambivalence about the impending catastrophic event, that helps Justine to step out of 
her catatonic state, and to find within her the resources to distinguish between “real”, 
external objects such as Claire and Leo, and the persecutory internalised versions that 
dominated the internal landscape of her mind during her depression.  
It is worth noting here, again, that von Trier also deploys splitting in the 
formal construction of this narrative. In this film, he abandons his usual penchant for 
a singular lead female character, instead deciding to cast two women, and to divide 
the narrative into two complementary parts. Building on Klein’s observation that all 
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internal objects are grounded in the experience of the earliest parental imagoes, and 
on von Trier’s own candid admission that this film, like Antichrist, was conceived in 
response to his own history of clinical depression, it is interesting to contextualise 
these formal and directorial decisions with reference to a story that von Trier likes to 
tell about his personal relationship with his mother, and a shock disclosure that she 
made to him just before she died: 
 
On her deathbed, in 1995, Inger confessed that Ulf, who had died when von 
Trier was 18, had not been his real father – he was actually a moderately 
famous Danish composer, with whom Inger had had an affair in order to 
provide Lars with an artistic genetic inheritance. Inger assured von Trier that 
his biological father would welcome him, but their meeting was not a success: 
'I hated him', says von Trier, 'and he didn't want see me. He instructed me to 
communicate through his lawyers'. The events precipitated what von Trier 
calls 'my first real breakdown'. In 1996, two months after his mother's death, 
he left his wife, Caecilia Holbeck, who was pregnant with their second child, 
and took up with their nanny, Bente Froge, with whom he now has two boys. 
He converted to Catholicism (having previously believed himself to be Jewish, 
as Ulf was). (Husband 2008) 
 
Subsequently, von Trier has asserted that Melancholia is intended in the spirit of 
saying “Fuck you!” to his mother, years after these events took place, giving us 
insight into the persistence of traumatic feeling and fury. The splitting that shapes 
both the filmic narrative and its form symbolises, perhaps, one means of externalising 
the conflicted ambivalence around the internalised maternal imago when a beloved 
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mother unveils a deceit that has profound ramifications at a point in time when her 
loss is imminent and irrecuperable. If, as von Trier has repeatedly asserted, 
filmmaking is a tool for the management of depression and for recovery from it, then 
the formal structure of the film could be seen to symbolise the psychical strategies at 
work. For the viewer, there is plenty of scope for resonance with individual 
experiences of mental ill health and/or ambivalence, and Melancholia provides both 
opportunities for identification with characterological experience, and for deeply 
affective reverberations prompted by the mise-en-scène and filmic structure 
combined. Melancholia, then, is potentially stirred up in the viewer unconsciously, 
deepening our understanding of the workings of projective identification in cinema, as 
I shall discuss below. 
Plenty could also be said about the melancholic texture of experience 
symbolised by Claire and John, their dance around suicide, and by the scenes 
depicting the interplanetary clash to come with the opportunities that this affords to 
Justine for revelling in her melancholy literally by bathing in the light of the 
threatening planet (Figure 1). All of these narrative dimensions fuel the mood of 
melancholy that pervades the film. As film philosopher, Robert Sinnerbrink (2016, p. 
106) notes, Melancholia 
 
explores, in an evocative fashion, the kinship between melancholia and artistic 
creativity, the kind of aesthetic mood regarded as conducive to aesthetically 
mediated ways of knowing … One of the most striking aspects of 
Melancholia’s aesthetics of mood concerns the manner in which it also evokes 
an ethical sensibility or acknowledgement of the fragility, vulnerability, and 
value of life on our planet. 
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Figure 1: Justine bathes in the light of planet Melancholia (frame grab still from 
Melancholia, dir. Lars von Trier, 2011. Used under fair use policy guidelines.) 
 
As Sinnerbrink (2016, p. 107), goes on to state,  
 
it is important to distinguish between moods attributed to a character 
perspective and moods expressed by the work of art itself. … The mood of a 
work is distinct from the mood of the spectator, even though the work’s mood 
– expressing, for example, the perspective of the film’s narration, of a 
narrator, or a character – usually aims to elicit certain moods from its 
audience. 
 
For Sinnerbrink, this “ethical” dimension of cinematic moodfulness charts a complex 
relationship between moral, psychological, existential, and ontological dimensions of 
experience. It is useful to deepen Sinnerbrink’s important reading of Melancholia as 
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mood by reflecting on the role of the unconscious, and its impact on affective 
engagement with art, and the work of Christopher Bollas (1987) is helpful here.  
 Bollas (1987, pp. 99-100) observes that ‘we need to experience moods’ and 
that ‘some moods establish fragments of former self states’. Building on these ideas, 
Bollas discusses a number of case examples in which moodfulness impacts on the 
capacity of the analyst to function as a transformational object for the analysand, 
noting that, in some cases, specifically when moods resemble ‘intense affect 
sensations’ (Bollas 1987, p. 109), they provide a way ‘to preserve sensation as a way 
of life’. This insight seems highly pertinent for this discussion of Melancholia, and for 
my understanding of my own moodful incapacity to respond to the experience of 
viewing the film. Bollas (1987, p. 111) goes on to theorise the concept of ‘the 
conservative object’ that is formed in response to undergoing ‘an intensely private 
self experience that defies representative capacity, so that the being state persists as a 
conserved rather than transformed (symbolized) phenomenon’. Linking the conserved 
object to the unthought known, Bollas argues that a mood can release a conserved 
object, and he links this to the vulnerability associated with a person who is ’caught in 
a mood’ (1987, p.112), suggesting that ‘it is as if we are witness to an element of the 
“kernel” (Winnicott, 1952) of the person being acted out in our presence’. To an 
extent, then, my apparently intense resistance – another feature attributed by Bollas to 
psychoanalytic knowing of the conservative object – to von Trier’s film can be 
understood as being ‘caught up’ in its profoundly melancholic mood such that my 
own psyche was unable to represent the experience, to cognise it, or to link the being 
state it evokes with any one object of my own. Bollas (1987, pp. 110-11) usefully 
sums up the overwhelmingly affective consequence of such experience: ‘Such self 
states are … untranslatable into that symbolic order characteristic of object 
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representation: they yield, instead, identity senses … the being state persists as a 
conserved object’. The melancholic gaze plunges us into the unthought known, and 
this is the achievement of von Trier’s work in my view.  
As spectators of Melancholia, we do actually know in advance that, in this 
tale, everyone will die in the end. This is thanks to the film’s overture, a precursor to 
the film that “rephrases” or “rehearses” the story yet to come. In his writing on a 
Lacanian approach to the psychology of melancholia, Russell Grigg (2014) cites an 
observation made by Goethe: ‘We die twice: first when we die, and then when those 
who knew and loved us die’. This seems highly apposite when we think about how 
the narrative of this film unfolds. As spectators, of course, we do not literally die, but 
we do take up identificatory perspectives on scenes of total earthly annihilation, and 
so we might be said to die at the level of fantasy at least. We are placed in an 
apparently impossible position by the film’s ending – we watch a story that entails the 
total destruction of all life and yet, paradoxically, we survive this annihilation and live 
to tell the tale, perhaps to watch it over again, albeit the case that we might not feel 
able to speak its impact as in my own experience. This is surely a very melancholic 
paradox, and one that richly reverberates with Bollas’s formulation of the unthought 
known.  
The overture has an important function for the viewer of this film, acting as 
what Griselda Pollock (1998, p. 113) describes in her work on Jan Vermeer, as an 
‘index of a lost moment before a death’ in which ‘the anguish of loss is not in the 
image itself , but in the practice of its restaged [pre-staged?] encounter where to look 
is to feel’. For me, this cinematic beginning plays an important part in shaping the 
spectator’s relationship to the film as an object, allowing us to envision our 
relationship to what we see on screen in ways that circumvent the kind of narcissistic 
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over-identification with the image theorised in perspectives on spectatorship and 
desire (Doane 1996). As Serge Tisseron (2013, p. 122) has suggested, ‘fiction sets in 
play a continuous back-and-forth movement between the internalisation of certain of 
the hero's traits and the projection of certain aspects of oneself onto the hero’. The 
cultural object invites relatedness, allowing the viewer actively (and yet also 
unconsciously) to engage with it. As we know from Winnicott, our encounters with 
culture provide opportunities to re-visit transitional phenomena, the first of which is 
the maternal breast, and I am struck here by the image of planet Melancholia striking 
the Earth in longshot and its symbolic evocation of the breast (Figure 2).  
 
 
 
Figure 2: The collision between Earth and planet Melancholia (frame grab still from 
Melancholia, dir. Lars von Trier, 2011. Used under fair use policy guidelines.) 
 
For Winnicott, transitional phenomena allow us to experience anew the creative 
bridging between internal and external worlds following on from the holding 
experience with the mother, and our eventual separation from her. Yet it is important 
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to distinguish the kind of engagement we make with the object if we are to understand 
its psychological function.  
Winnicott reminds us that in object-relating: ‘the subject allows certain 
alterations in the self to take place … The object has become meaningful’ (Winnicott 
1969, p. 712). In object usage: ‘because of the survival of the object, the subject may 
now have started to live a life in the world of objects, and so the subject stands to gain 
immeasurably.’ (1969, p. 713) Because the object is capable of always being 
destroyed, it is felt by the subject to be more real (1969, p. 715). The object, in this 
formulation, becomes something that we seek to destroy in order better to be able to 
tolerate it so as to be able to use it constructively as a means of shoring up our 
fractured senses of identity. In counterpoint to my reading of the affective experience 
of viewing the story of Justine in Melancholia, the overture, then, arguably allows us 
to perceive of the film as a reliable psychological object, one that can survive our 
efforts to destroy it, and which therefore extends an invitation to the viewer to take it 
in for later psychological engagement. The film does not only tell us that it will show 
us the end of the world before showing it to us. It also offers us the opportunity to 
experience a fantasy of annihilation as if it were our own through its invitation to 
identify with the central characters, their moods, and their experience. However, it 
also sets out to forewarn us that this will come at a cost, while offering reassurance 
that the cost will eventually become bearable, if we are able to take in the object and 
to find a way of beginning to speak its experience, as I have struggled to do for so 
long in relation to von Trier’s film. A Winnicottian approach to this dynamic allows 
me to sustain a hopeful and creative relationship to the experience. I can use it to try 
to forge an understanding of von Trier’s well-documented experiences of depression 
and mental ill health, and potentially therefore to make creative use of this experience 
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to articulate my own encounters with melancholic feelings. 
In my earlier writing on von Trier’s work in the “depression trilogy” of films 
(Bainbridge 2014), I have suggested that it can be seen to have therapeutic potential, 
and that this can be understood through the combined lenses of work by Winnicott on 
potential space, Klein on projective identification, and Bion on containment. Film 
becomes a means of working through the violent psychological experience of 
depression using the mechanisms of projection and projective identification, 
mechanisms that we use to make unbearable experience visible to others (Bainbridge 
2014). In this way, film comes to carry a kind of therapeutic potential for both 
director and spectator. However, Thomas Ogden (1982, p. 26) reminds us that Bion 
offers an interesting take on such experience from a different angle: ‘Bion insists that 
projective identification is not only a fantasy but a manipulation of one person by 
another and thus an interpersonal interaction’. Perhaps, then, film provides a means of 
communicating experience, so that cinema becomes a form of Bionian container 
(Bainbridge 2014; Fuery 2018) – but this formulation requires us to think about how 
the contained can be conceptualised in, through, or with film and its consumption.  
Since publishing my work on these themes, however, and since re-visiting 
Melancholia in preparation for my public discussions of it, I have begun to think 
about Bion's take on dreaming. For Bion, dreams are unconscious thoughts generated 
in response to lived emotional experience, and they provide us with impetus for doing 
unconscious psychological work (Ogden 2004, p. 1355). As Ogden (2004, p. 1354) 
suggests, for Bion, ‘the idea of the container-contained addresses not what we think, 
but the way we think, that is, how we process lived experience and what occurs 
psychically when we are unable to do psychological work with that experience’. 
There are striking parallels between Bion’s ideas here, Ogden’s re-working of them, 
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and early work on “cinepsychoanalysis” and the filmic apparatus. In film theory, the 
analogy between the dream and cinema is commonplace, but it is usually figured 
through Freudian or Lacanian ideas (Baudry 1970, 1992; Metz 1982). What would it 
mean to conceptualise notions of the gaze, cinematic identification, and so on in terms 
of object relations more generally, and through Bion's work in particular?  
Bion's preoccupation with thinking gives us new ways to conceptualise the 
complexity of cinematic experience, as Kelli Fuery (2018) has observed. Such an 
approach offers a rich framework through which to reflect on viewing experiences of 
Melancholia, affording important perspectives on dimensions of artistic practice and 
its impact on spectatorship. In the context of Melancholia, however, it goes further, 
allowing us to read through the palimpsest of imagery, music, narrative, character, 
and film form to articulate unspeakable aspects of human experience in ways that 
facilitate the representation of profound psychological distress. We are both invited 
into the film with its lure of identification, and yet simultaneously reminded to hold 
our distance. The dream-screen metaphor is re-cast here so that it is not so much a 
discourse on fantasy and desire as one on the pursuit of experience in the name of 
psychological work. The ambivalence of this spectator position becomes complicated 
and difficult to keep in mind, as my own experience of this film shows.  
Arguably, the ambivalent viewing positions situates us as melancholic through 
and through, leaving us with a profound sense of loss at the end of the film, and yet, at 
the same time, with a distinct lack of clarity around the question of knowing what it is 
that has been lost. We are positioned as viewers with ‘binocular vision’ (Bion 1965, p. 
66) from the outset of the film, as I have already highlighted in my discussion of the 
overture. It is as though, in order to take up the invitation inherent in the projective 
identification offered by von Trier as filmmaker, we have to struggle to become 
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containers in order to make sense of the work. We have to internalise the experience 
underpinning the film as if it were our own, with all the implications that this demand 
carries in terms of taking in a loss that does not belong to us, but which, following 
Klein, serves to remind us of all our own previous experiences of loss. In taking up 
this invitation, then, we appear to adopt a particularly melancholic gaze, one that 
might account for the self-denigration and self-silencing that has taken place in my 
own response to the film, and my inability to speak of it until recently. Or it might 
entail an ambivalent response in which von Trier is dismissed as “a clown”, playing 
with ideas of emotion and psychological experience – an image offered to me by a 
colleague when I first mentioned that I was trying to find a way to discuss my 
experience of this film, and one that is common in media coverage of the director 
(Bradshaw 2011; Kermode 2011; Romney 1996). 
In conclusion, then, what might all of this mean? Is there any possibility of 
finding meaning in a melancholic experience? Von Trier (Sweet 2011, 3.35-4:45) 
himself offers some useful insight here, articulating the importance of a 
psychoanalytic approach to thinking about the place of melancholia in the field of 
human experience: 
 
Melancholia is such an important ingredient in everything that surrounds us … 
It is like salt when you make food. If there is no salt in the food, it just doesn’t, 
… it brings out the taste. And melancholia is in everything, in music, in 
painting, and if it’s not there, it’s just not worth using tiem on. So, of course, 
melancholia, and I think it is in many people, and it is this strange longing, 
and it’s the wolf, you know, crying at the moon, or whatever, and it iss beauty, 
and it’s scary, and it’s cold, and it’s warm, and it’s … no, melancholia is a 
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very human thing, and when it goes further than just being melancholia, and 
being, goes to a depression, or anxiety, or whatever mental disease, then it’s of 
course not good, but it’s a very important part of being a human.  
 
Von Trier is certainly not the only artist to specify the particular appeal of 
melancholia in relation to the creative process, and art history furnishes us with 
plentiful examples of creative renditions of this link between depression and human 
nature. One of the most famous artworks associated with the melancholic condition is, 
of course, Albrecht Dürer’s (1514) famous engraving, Melencholia I, in which 
melancholia is figured as feminine. The links here to the feminine take us 
immediately back to von Trier’s mother’s cruelty, and to the craving for maternal 
containment that resounds through the narrative of Melancholia, allowing us to read 
von Trier’s provocations1 as elaborate defences, of the kind invoked by Freud himself 
(1917). Importantly, however, these links also provide new opportunities for re-
thinking that old chestnut of film studies – the question of gender and its relationship 
to the cinematic gaze. Conceiving of cinema as a potential scene of maternal 
containment might allow us to develop a deeper understanding of the emotional 
opportunities afforded by film and the sometimes puzzling, perverse pleasures we 
find in exploring unthinkable and unspeakable experience by means of this medium. 
Perhaps part of the problem with trying to think about the work of Lars von Trier is 
that it alerts us to our own internal iterations of his unpalatable character. I am left 
with the question of whether it is any wonder, then, that I have struggled to speak 
about this film, given its deeply troubling resonances. But perhaps this is also why the 
invitations to do so have been so compelling.  
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Notes 
1. Melancholia is also often cited as crucial in shaping both Romanticism, and its 
hijacking as part of the Nazi regime – an association that usefully evokes von Trier’s 
infamous remarks at Cannes in 2011. When asked by a journalist from The Times 
about his personal German roots, the gothic aspect of Melancholia, and his interest in 
the Nazi aesthetic, von Trier responded outrageously with the following highly 
offensive remarks: ‘I thought I was a Jew for a long time, and I was very happy being 
a Jew, … but it turned out that I was not a Jew, and even if I’d been a Jew, I would be 
kind of a second-rate Jew, because there are [sic] a hierarchy in the Jewish fabulation. 
But anyway, I really wanted to be a Jew, and then I found out that I was really a Nazi, 
because my family was German … which also gave me some pleasure … what can I 
say? I understand Hitler … and I sympathise with him a little bit’ 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QpUqpLh0iRw) . Despite the palpable 
offensiveness on show, von Trier’s readiness to deploy unpalatable (and unsuccessful) 
“humour” in relation to such a shocking theme, can also be read as a form of 
psychological defence. The reference to the trauma inflicted on him by his mother’s 
revelation about his parentage is indicative here. At one level, von Trier’s 
unspeakably offensive remarks provide a measure of the unspeakable nature of this 
traumatic experience and the violent psychic losses that it created for him.  
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